

In: *Respect in the Neighbourhood: Why Neighbourliness Matters*, edited by Kevin Harris. Russell House, 2006, pp. 105-113.

Chapter 8

Respect in the Lowlands and the UK: a Cultural Comparison of Policy and Practice

Jan Steyaert

Introduction

Ever since 9/11, Bali, Madrid and London, international terrorism has been high on everybody's agenda. The traditional focus of police forces shifts to the higher levels of the violence spectrum. It's intriguing to observe that this development seems to go hand in hand with an equally increased focus on the very lowest levels of the violence spectrum, where it's more about respect, anti-social behaviour and incivility than 'real' violence.

Is this development an example of a policy-hungry government taking us towards a 1984-type of society, or a next step in civilisation? This chapter tries to tease out some of the issues surrounding governmental involvement with respect by contrasting the UK development with those in 'the lowlands' (Flanders and the Netherlands). In both countries, respect also features on the public agenda and both policy and new social interventions are being developed and implemented. It should however be noted that the choice to describe these two countries to contrast the UK developments described elsewhere in this book, is a convenience sample rather than the result of cross-European assessment of innovative practices or policies dealing with respect.

A thought experiment

Let us start with a thought experiment. When was the last time that you had problems with the behaviour of somebody else, that the way another person acted in the public domain annoyed you? That could be because of queue jumping, throwing litter on the street, making loud mobile phone calls on the train, dog shit that some dog owner didn't clean up, loud music, smoking in a restaurant, or any other kind of frequently occurring but potentially unpleasant behaviour. Secondly, try identifying when was the last time you took the trouble to address other persons on the burden of their behaviour for you and other citizens, or when somebody else addressed you regarding your behaviour?

My assumption and personal experience is that the first question of this thought experiment is easy to answer and results in numerous recent memories of little irritations we felt as a result of somebody else's behaviour in the public realm. But at the same time the answer to the second question is less easy and results in fewer and older recollections. Does this mean that we have lost the skills or interest to address other citizens regarding the cost of their behaviour in the public domain on our own well-being? Has the framework for informal social control been eroded?

A number of factors could contribute to such development. For one, our activities and social networks are no longer tied to the neighbourhood. Over the past century, the average distance a person travels a day has increased tenfold, from 4 km to almost 40 km a day (Grübler, 1998; Urry, 2003). Moreover, much of that mobility no longer allows interaction (as in trains or by bicycle) but happens in our own private cocoon (cars).

Not only has mobility changed the nature of the interpersonal contacts we have, so has technology. Kevin Harris, in his opening chapter to this book, rightly mentions the growth of self service in shopping and entertainment. We no longer go to the bank office, but spend our Sunday afternoon working our way through e-banking. We no longer spend time in the bookshop, but use amazon.co.uk. The replacement of face-to-face contacts by face-to-screen contacts is of course a transition that started fifty years ago, once the number of televisions started equalling and surpassing the

number of households. Putnam's (2000) seminal work on the decline of social capital identifies this as one of the key elements in changing interpersonal relations, although others argue changes in civic engagement are more related to changing content preferences than changing technology (Hooghe, 2002; Norris, 1996).

Both developments give us great freedom to be more selective in our social contacts and no longer limit our social network to neighbours. At the same time, they also imply that we see many more utterly unfamiliar people. There's a process towards polarisation of the familiarity of our interpersonal contacts. While half a century ago most citizens tended to meet more or less the same people over longer periods of time, given restricted mobility, this is now very different. Currently, that familiarity of the average interaction with fellow citizens has either increased (through selectivity in our social network, we are more picky about our strong social relations) or decreased (through spending more time in the 'anonymous public realm'). An increasing part of our time implies interacting with people whom we have never met before, with whom our interaction is very limited and whom we may never meet again. Lacking a sense of social function for the public space, we continue to privatise it:

'Today, we experience an ease of motion unknown to any prior urban civilization...we take unrestricted motion of the individual to be an absolute right. The private motorcar is the logical instrument for exercising that right, and the effect on public space, especially the space of the urban street, is that the space becomes meaningless or even maddening unless it can be subordinated to free movement.' (Sennett, 1978, p. 14).

Another explanation for diminished informal social control might be the erosion of social hierarchy and increased informality. Again, that is a welcome change in society as it reflects equality between citizens and democratisation. But it comes with a rebound effect. 'Status problems are a logical consequence of informalisation. The clothing of status – the uniform - no longer automatically commands respect. Respect must be earned and that can imply struggle.' (Schnabel, 2004, p. 58).

Continuing the thought experiment and answering the question about the last occasion that we confronted someone about their behaviour, I can personally only come up with memories of talking to some kids playing with matches, and

unsuccessfully trying to persuade an obviously very drunk adult not to drive his car home. In both cases, there's an assumed presence of hierarchy (being adult, being sober). Can we develop new skills that allow us to build respect and exercise informal control without reinstating hierarchy in the public sphere?

We seem to have lost the skills, assuming we ever had them, to negotiate with fellow-citizens about behaviour in public space. The implication is that at the same time we both accept a wider range of behaviour and get irritated by some other behaviours. Rather than discuss and challenge uncivil behaviour, it seems we expect government to provide a framework to guarantee respect. We outsource our responsibility regarding respect.

This is not a development that's specific to the UK. In this chapter, I will outline how governments react to this outsourcing process. I describe the Flemish and Dutch situation, concluding with a consideration of the lessons that can be learned from comparing those with each other and the UK.

The Netherlands

In April 2006, the Dutch minister for integration and immigration, Rita Verdonk, accepted the first copy of a new book entitled *How we do this ... in the Netherlands*. It attempts to summarise the everyday values and norms in the Netherlands, and is intended for use in integration courses (Snel & van der Zaag, 2006). It notes for example that when somebody has their birthday, one also wishes the other members of that household a happy birthday (p78); or that making eye contact is important during a conversation; and that Dutch people are quite candid when it comes to telling somebody else that they are mistaken (p181). In addition it provides resources like the text and origins of the national anthem or the structure of the education system. This book provides a kind of manual for interaction with the Dutch and living in the Netherlands.

The respect agenda in the Netherlands is however much broader than can be covered by a printed 'manual'. Shortly after starting in his post, Minister-president

Balkenende made reference to the Commission on human values in Norway¹ and announced a similar initiative for the Netherlands: ‘the discussion about values and norms must return to the centre of the political and social arena.’² There is political consensus around the analysis that an assertive lifestyle and increased candidness has provided the ground for uncivil behaviour. While goals like self-development are legitimate and part of human progress, there has been insufficient recognition that not everybody has enough skills and capacities for self-development (this analysis is reflected in, for example, the work of Gabriël van der Brink). Government consequently needs to move beyond a socio-economic agenda and engage with ethics, values and norms.

The suggested commission didn’t happen, but a broad debate on values and norms emerged, partly through established media like television and partly through new media (see, for example, www.16miljoenmensen.nl). Furthermore, the highly respected Scientific Council for Government Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor Regeringsbeleid, WRR) started a project on norms and values in Dutch society and what government could and should do in this area (de Beer & Schuyt, 2004; van den Brink, 2004; WRR, 2003).

The WRR suggests using a continuum of norm-trespassing behaviour, not fundamentally different from the one suggested by Kevin Harris in chapter 1. The WRR’s version starts with unpleasant behaviour and continues to uncivil behaviour, through unacceptable behaviour to end at illegal behaviour. Along this continuum, a transition happens from social informal norms to legal formal norms. There is also a transition from diversity to unity. What exactly constitutes unpleasant behaviour can differ from one person to another, even for the same person from one mood setting to another. Sometimes we might find loud conversations over mobile phones annoying, e.g. when we’re trying to get some work done or have just found out we’ve been lied to; at other times such behaviour doesn’t bother us. With uncivil behaviour, there’s already less diversity, for example fewer people would find it normal and pleasant for litter to be dropped rather than put in a garbage can. With illegal behaviour, there’s near-unity, enforced by police and the legal system. The issue is to strike a healthy

¹ See their website at <http://www.verdikommisjonen.no/english.htm>

² Speech by Balkenende, 31 August 2002, available at <http://www.minaz.nl/data/1030783766.pdf>

balance between diversity and unity. A permissive society allows for greater diversity, while a cultural-pessimist such as Dalrymple would rather see less of it, even where it relates to informal social norms (Dalrymple, 2005).

Based on research carried out by the Dutch Social and Cultural Planning Office (Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, SCP) since 1970, one can conclude that Dutch citizens have gained an increasingly coherent consensus about values and norms, also in the informal area. But they are increasingly pessimistic about the implementation of these values and norms in daily behaviour (WRR, 2003, chapter 3). Expectations regarding behaviour in the public realm have become clearer and are given higher priority, which contradicts the belief that our values and norms have been weakened (van den Brink, 2004). There is a process of increased normative awareness (*normatieve ophoging*) which results in high expectations that easily turn into frustrations. Contrary to expectations, 'large and increasing concerns about values and norms seem to go hand in hand with decreasing uncertainty about what those values and norms should be' (de Beer, 2004, p. 237).

Higher and better defined norms are one thing: developments in actual behaviour might well be different. Has behaviour worsened during the last decades? Are we now more anti-social participants in the public sphere than 50 or 100 years ago?

One problem is that the kind of low-level incivilities we're talking about here (spitting, queue jumping, not cleaning up dog shit...) remain well below the radar of research and don't show up in statistical surveys. That makes it problematic to make statements about this kind of behaviour occurring more or less regularly over time. Analysis of several years of the security monitor (one of the regular surveys in the Netherlands) does not allow us to identify clear trends in anti-social behaviour. In the absence of such data, one can nonetheless ask if increased attention for anti-social behaviour in the media and some highly watched programmes (e.g. the 'Tokkies' or 'probleemwijken') contribute to our increased sensitivity to incivilities (de Beer, 2004).

Whether our behaviour has worsened or expectations have increased, the result is an increased tension between behaviour and expectations, resulting in a call for

government to act against the burden of incivilities. The WRR describes the role of government as reducing formal norm-trespassing behaviour, guaranteeing the values of an open society and democratic state as well as supporting public morality. It argues that the 'management' of social norms is not a task for government, but for citizens. Van den Brink uses the concept of 'civilization offensive' (*beschavingsoffensief*), by which he refers to the need for a massive initiative to bring morality back into social life and decrease the variety of both private and public norms and values (van den Brink, 2004). That call resulted, among other things, in a media campaign against people with short fuses and promoting tolerance.

Others see an important role for education, and call for a democratic-pedagogical offensive (*democratisch-pedagogisch offensief*) (De Winter, 2004). Socialisation processes are now geared too much towards the individual, and not enough towards the community. Engaging with the values and norms of a democratic society in the educational process is not a free choice of individuals, but something to which society (for which read: government, schools) must commit itself. Democracy does not naturally reproduce itself. Education for citizenship through schools should safeguard the structural elements of the current and the future democracy. Since early 2006, all schools in the Netherlands have been obliged to have activities around citizenship. How this is done varies between schools. Through projects like 'the peaceful school' (*de vreedzame school*)³, pupils can already learn the importance of tolerance and conflict handling skills at primary school.

Street etiquette and mediation

There are many ways to work on strengthening respect. While some Dutch politicians would love to import the British innovation of anti-social behaviour orders (ASBOs), this has not yet happened. A more popular and regularly used intervention is working with so-called street- or city-etiquettes. This approach originally stems from Rotterdam (Diekstra, 2001, 2004), where work on behavioural rules for young citizens led to the question whether the city would not benefit from behavioural rules for all citizens, not just youth-at-risk. The core element of the street-etiquette is that

³ See <http://www.devreedzameschool.nl/>

citizens define the behavioural rules on how to act in the public realm themselves. This includes designing the rules, and also monitoring implementation. In such situations, the local authority is not extending its control into the fine details of daily life nor is it expanding the formal legal rules to a painstaking level of detail. Rather it supports citizens in their self-regulating capacities. This includes 'positioning the subject in the media, scanning the city for existing or emerging etiquettes and supporting citizens experimenting with etiquettes' (Diekstra, 2001, p. 103). This approach differs from the Rotterdam citizenship code that was launched early 2006. This code also deals with behaviour in the public realm (such as 'use Dutch as main language' and 'treat homosexual people as equal to heterosexual people') but was developed by the city council rather than citizens themselves.

Meanwhile, the experiences in Rotterdam resulted in city- and street-etiquettes initiatives in other Dutch cities. There are now 'golden city rules' in Gouda, the guidelines in Maassluis, Ede has its *mEdeburgerschap* (fellow citizenship) and street-etiquette experiments in Amsterdam, Delft and Almere. This approach is not very different from the rules developed in the robotics class as described by Kevin Harris towards the end of Chapter 1. Or to the house rules students have and develop when new students enter college accommodation (who cleans the hall or stairway, do we cook and eat together once a week, who takes care of the garbage...?). But it is innovative in the sense that it happens on the level of a street or small neighbourhood, and the rules emerge bottom-up with the local authority only facilitating.

The other social intervention that emerged from the increased attention for incivility and call for respect is neighbourhood mediation. It's basically a problem solving intervention (whereas street etiquette is of a more preventive nature). Where problems between neighbours or citizens in the same public realm occur, independent trained mediators are available. Across the Netherlands, there are currently about 70 of these initiatives, involving 1,200 voluntary mediators. Key to their approach is re-establishing the dialogue between all citizens involved in a conflict, so they can solve the issue themselves. This avoids taking things up to courts,

but also generates problem solving skills that can be useful for possible future conflicts.⁴

Flanders

The respect agenda in Flanders is much less outspoken compared to the UK or the Netherlands. Rather, one could describe it as a mosaic, with different little stones being in place but no clear design of the larger picture emerging yet. Four recent developments can be described as examples of these little stones.

The most recent example is the committee on 'orientation on society'. The committee was initiated by Marino Keulen, Flemish minister of housing, media and sport. Their task was to describe what the Flemish values and norms are and which common basket of values and norms is necessary for living together in diversity. When they presented the results of their work, early May 2006, the committee's chair indicated that it was surprisingly easy to outline the essential values: freedom, equality, solidarity, respect and citizenship. These values are the basis on which norms are built. These come as legal norms (which can be enforced by law) and as social norms (which are related to specific groups to which people can belong).

While initially the work of this committee was to be used to develop courseware for the numerous training initiatives that welcome new immigrants, minister Marino Keulen has already used the report as the basis for a meeting with top-level representatives of the six major religions. After the local elections (autumn 2006), he proposes a larger debate around the committee's findings.

A second development that relates to respect comes from the same minister. When redesigning the law on social housing in 2005, two new regulations were inserted. One was that new tenants in social housing estates had to be able to speak Flemish, or be willing to learn the language within two years. Free courses are provided. The other regulation indicated that there was a 'probation period' of two years in each new social housing contract. Within that timeframe, people could lose their right to

⁴ See <http://www.hetccv.nl/> for more information on the method of neighbourhood mediation.

social housing if there were problems with anti-social behaviour or unpaid rent. Both regulations were argued for by referring to them as cornerstones for more respect and civil behaviour in social housing neighbourhoods. How could tenants establish some respect and civility towards other citizens and in the communication between tenants and housing associations if there was not at least a minimal level of a common language? One director of a housing association supported the regulation by indicating they had tenants speaking as many as 80 different languages with few people sharing the same language, let alone Flemish. That makes communication between tenants and between tenant and housing association a daunting task, leaving civil relations vulnerable to rapid erosion.

This development is extra sensitive because of Belgium's history. Language issues are sensitive in Flanders, being one part of the three-language nation of Belgium (French is spoken in the Walloon area, German in a small part in the east of the country). Only since the 1930s has higher education been provided in languages other than French. The hope to establish Flemish as an official language played an important part in both world wars and politics throughout the twentieth century. Given that Flanders is now economically stronger than the Walloons, imposing language requirements seems like taking revenge. Citizens from Walloon would have to learn Flemish in order to be able to apply for social housing in the Brussels area. The Walloon politicians are furious, while some Walloon academics defend the language requirement.

A third development involves a new infrastructure to support respect and to police incivilities through a transition of responsibilities from national law and courts to local authorities. A new law (initially from 1999, but only fully implemented in 2005) recognises the fact that justice courts were not structured to deal adequately with incivilities and anti-social behaviour. This resulted in the situation that local police could only register violations of national laws and depended on the justice courts to follow them up. In most cases, this didn't happen. This resulted in police not bothering very much about small unpleasant or anti-social situations. Since 1999, local authorities can outline their own 'codes of conduct in the public realm' for those situations which are not covered by national law. Since April 2005, national law no longer covers anti-social situations like noisy neighbours, graffiti or low-level

vandalism. This gives local authorities the room to develop their own policy in this area. Moreover, local authorities can issue local fines, currently up to 250 euros. These so-called '*gemeentelijke administratieve sancties*' no longer have to pass through justice courts, which makes it a more efficient and reliable instrument to handle incivilities. Additionally, unlike 'real' fines, they can also be issued to young people, under the age of 16.

The first of these new fines was issued in August 2005, in Maaseik, to a woman wearing a burka. Some ten years earlier, a national regulation already indicated that all citizens should be recognisable in the public realm and no 'disguises' are allowed. In June 2006 the woman lost her appeal procedure in court. The argument for people being personally identifiable in public space, visible for face-to-face communication, trumped arguments about diversity and the individual freedom to express cultures. It is now expected that more local authorities will implement a local 'code of conduct' against burkas. A parallel in local practice, although not supported by national regulation, can be drawn with the banning of young people wearing 'hoodies' and baseball caps at the Bluewater shopping centre in Kent, England. This was followed up by discussion in the UK on the 'hoodie generation' and the opinions expressed by Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott and Archbishop John Sentamu (BBC News, 2006a).

It is not only local governments that struggle with respect and 'symbolic clothing' in public spaces, but also employers and trade unions at the workplace. In early summer 2006, the multinational Group 4 Securicor sacked a long-time employee (a receptionist) in Antwerp, just after she started wearing a head scarf. A year earlier, that same employee had received a bonus as a result of her good work. The employer now argues it requests strict neutrality from its employees. The trade union has already announced it is exploring taking this to the labour court.

The discussion on burkas and other signs of religion and culture is of course highly sensitive. It relates to diversity and global citizenship, and also to the question of how these religious/ethnic symbols relate to modern values like gender equality and emancipation. There seem to be fewer problems in accepting Jewish men wearing skull caps (kippahs) than Islamic girls wearing head scarves, or westerners wearing

jewellery with the Catholic cross as a symbol. Is that because we identify head scarves with oppression of women, because the Islamic culture is more distant from our western culture than the Jewish culture, or the result of power and status positions? Should we expand the discussion to include tattoos, which could also be said to be symbols of a certain lifestyle?

In Flanders, the use of the new framework is however more extensive than the specific situation referred to. Some of the bigger Flemish cities have taken up the new opportunities to develop a policy to reduce incivilities and strengthen respect. Noteworthy examples are Mechelen (where young people acting in an anti-social way are taken to police headquarters, from where their parents can pick them up again after a warning about their parental responsibilities); Leuven (a small university city, where incivilities related to student parties have become less tolerated); and Antwerp (for example with a very successful campaign against dog shit on pavements and in the parks). Other cities, like Gent or Brussels, have so far taken little action.

A final little stone in the Flemish mosaic of respect relates to a public debate emerging early in 2006 after a judge ruled that youngsters could no longer make use of a youth centre in the village of Lauwe, after complaints by neighbours. There had been earlier cases of neighbours complaining about infrastructure for children, for instance centres for after school child care. The complaints mostly focused on the burden of noise and dangerous traffic situations around the time children were brought or recollected. In other cases, people complained about too many cyclists going too fast through their neighbourhood, resulting in a local speed limit of 30kph.

But no earlier case raised the amount of reaction and discussion Lauwe did. The youth centre is the property of the local authority and a venue where activities during school holidays and youth parties during the year are organised. It is in the middle of a neighbourhood where houses dominate the scene, and not near industry or other noise/traffic producing infrastructure. Once the judge ruled that the centre could no longer be used during school holidays, a lot of people and institutions protested about anti-social citizens and the decline of tolerance and respect. They included the Children's Commissioner, the minister for youth and a whole range of youth organisations such as the boy scouts. A protest march against closure of the youth

centre attracted about 10,000 participants. All expressed shock at how easily people step into the NIMBY attitude: 'not in my backyard'. In one case, a neighbour even complained about the noise of a child day care centre which her own daughter previously attended. Public space is typically used by different citizens for different purposes and that calls for tolerance. The examples are seen as attempts from private citizens to colonise public space and make it an extension of their private space.

However, there's also another side to this story. In Lauwe, we're not talking about a small-scale youth centre but an accommodation that draws around 250 people each day, attracting young people from other villages outside Lauwe. It wasn't the youth centre as such that led to the complaint from some neighbours, but the scale of it. Also, these neighbours had been attempting for years to communicate with the local authority about noise reduction opportunities but were stone-walled. Other situations similar to Lauwe have more recently demonstrated that open communication and some minor changes (stop the noisy activities by 22.00 hours, replace noisy metal football goals with less-noisy goals ...) can provide a more constructive platform for tolerance. Respect is not a one-way street or a blank cheque but the result of dialogue and reciprocity.

Concluding remarks

Interest from media and politicians in how to safeguard respect in society is not restricted to the UK, but is found in the Netherlands, Flanders and other parts of Western Europe. That is somehow noteworthy, as there are no indications from survey data that there is an increase in anti-social behaviour. Although most of this behaviour is too small to pop up on the radar of social surveys, what's available in terms of data suggests that we are less tolerant of diversity of behaviour, rather than there being an increase in incivility. From that perspective, a heightened interest in respect is a further cultivation of society, rather than a defence against the erosion of our culture. Not less challenging, but a more optimistic agenda.

Also, there's a similarity between the three countries in that citizens (and media!) call on government and authorities to organise respect. While Jane Jacobs (1961) noted

the importance of informal control for public safety ('eyes on the street'), there seems to be an expectation among citizens of more 'official presence', more professionals and civil servants monitoring behaviour in the public realm.

'Negotiation' about what's acceptable behaviour and what's less acceptable is nothing special, but has always taken place. There are marvellous historical examples in Norbert Elias' major work on *The Civilizing Process*, on subjects like eating with a knife and fork, spitting, or blowing one's nose (Elias, 1978-1982). The historical rules we have established in these areas (no spitting, use a handkerchief) are not the same for people from all cultural backgrounds, causing diversity in norms and behaviour. There is consequently a 'permanent negotiation'.

But negotiations are also expanding into new parts of the public realm, following innovations and changes. Examples include netiquette, codes of conduct developed for behaviour in cyberspace; and the rules of conduct for mountain biking (ride on open trails only, don't leave trash).⁵ Values and norms are a 'moving target'. It is not surprising that a society that is more diverse in age and ethnic background needs to do some maintenance. It's only surprising that it took so long before there was any explicit attention paid to values and norms.

Within that context of maintenance work on our values and norms, it is surprising that in the three countries, UK, Netherlands and Flanders, most attention goes to our behaviour as pedestrians in the public realm, to interpersonal meetings. From surveys, we know that behaviour in traffic is the origin of most irritation; it is respect in traffic that's high on the agenda of citizens. In physical terms as well, in square meters, traffic makes for an increasing part of the public realm. Here, we have outsourced some aspects of respect to the physical infrastructure, with sleeping policemen, speed cameras and roundabouts forcing us to respect others in traffic, at the risk of damaging our car. Whatever progress has been made here, does not result in a decrease of traffic irritations in surveys. The focus policy-makers have on respect still seems to be off centre, looking too much into a direction the citizen isn't looking.

⁵ See <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netiquette>, and <http://www.abc-of-mountainbiking.com/mountain-biking-etiquette/>

References

- Dalrymple, T. (2005). *Our culture, what's left of it: The mandarins and the masses*: Ivan R. Dee.
- de Beer, P. (2004). Normvervaging in nederland: Perceptie of realiteit. *Sociologische Gids*, 51, 236-247.
- de Beer, P., & Schuyt, K. (2004). *Bijdragen aan normen en waarden*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam university press.
- De Winter, M. (2004). *Opvoeding, onderwijs en jeugdbeleid in het algemeen belang, de noodzaak van een democratisch-pedagogisch offensief*. den Haag: WRR.
- Diekstra, R. (2001). Stadsetiquette: Aansprekend gedrag in de publieke ruimte. In R. Hortulanus (Ed.), *Jong geleerd, oud gedaan* (pp. 91-111). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Diekstra, R. (2004). Stadsetiquette: Over waarden, normen en collectieve zelfredzaamheid van burgers. In P. de Beer & K. Schuyt (Eds.), *Bijdragen aan normen en waarden* (pp. 107-135). Amsterdam: Amsterdam university press.
- Elias, N. (1978-1982). *The civilizing process*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Grübler, A. (1998). *Technology and global change*. Cambridge: Cambridge university press.
- Hooghe, M. (2002). Watching television and civic engagement: Disentangling the effects of time, programs, and stations. *Harvard international journal of press and politics*, 7(2), 220-240.
- Norris, P. (1996). Does television erode social capital? A reply to putnam. *Political Science and Politics*, 29(3), 474-480.
- Schnabel, P. (2004). Het zestiende sociaal en cultureel rapport kijkt zestien jaar vooruit. In P. Schnabel & R. Bronneman (Eds.), *In het zicht van de toekomst, sociaal en cultureel rapport 2004* (pp. 47-90). den Haag: SCP.
- Sennett, R. (1978). *The fall of public man. On the social psychology of capitalism*. New York: Vintage books.
- Snel, K., & van der Zaag, J. (2006). *Hoe hoort het eigenlijk... in nederland?* Haarlem: Becht.
- Urry, J. (2003). Social networks, travel and talk. *British journal of sociology*, 54(2), 155-175.
- van den Brink, G. (2004). *Schets van een beschavingsoffensief: Over normen, normaliteit en normalisatie in nederland*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- WRR. (2003). *Waarden, normen en de last van het gedrag*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam university press.